These are the genuinely uncharted areas in one research programme — the places where the published record simply stops.
To prove each one is really empty, researchers pulled the closest existing work they could find: 225 published studies, papers and systems, at least 30 per area. Every area below shows what the world has managed so far, exactly where it falls short, and what the first real demonstration would have to look like. Written in plain language throughout — if a term needs explaining, it gets explained.
Every figure on this page carries a small tag saying how solid it is. Nothing here is presented as firmer than its source allows.
One honest caveat up front: the “nobody has done this” verdicts rest on targeted searching — 32 search queries plus reading of primary sources (journals including Nature, Science, PNAS, PLOS and arXiv) — not on an exhaustive review of everything ever published. Treat them as high confidence, not absolute proof. The full list of things that couldn’t be verified is at the bottom of the page.
All seven areas, the closest anyone has come, and the verdict. Tap any row to jump to its full page.
A brain–computer interface built from living neurons wired into a living mycelium network. Both halves have been built. The connection between them has not.
Scientists have grown tiny clumps of human brain cells in a dish and taught them to compute — one played the game Pong. Completely separately, other scientists have shown that mycelium — the root-like web a mushroom grows from — carries electrical signals and can act like simple computer parts.
Nobody, anywhere in the published record, has connected the two living things to each other. That missing connection is called a junction: a place where a signal can pass from neuron to fungus, or fungus to neuron. Building it would be a world first.
The neuron half of the junction, fully working — but its partner is silicon electrodes, not fungus.
The fungus half, fully working — but it talks to electrodes, never to a neuron.
Proof that a living-to-living junction can work at all — but both sides are neurons.
A living fungus inside a working control loop — fungus to machine, not fungus to neuron.
Grow the two together in one dish. Stimulate the neuron side and show — repeatably, with controls that rule out the equipment fooling you — that the mycelium’s electrical activity changes in response. Or the reverse. That single experiment, published, is the first neuron–fungus junction in history.
The researcher treats their own research process — how they pick questions, spot gaps, choose methods — as the thing being studied, and the loop measurably improves itself.
There are respected fields where people study themselves. Teachers study their own teaching. Anthropologists write about their own experience inside a culture. And “meta-research” studies science itself — but only in bulk, across thousands of papers at once.
What nobody has published: one researcher turning that lens on their own research process — recording their decisions, dead ends and revisions as data, and showing with numbers that studying the process made the research itself better. The loop that watches itself work, and improves because it watches.
The most developed first-person method anywhere — aimed at teaching, never at research.
The canonical self-observing loop — described for architects and teachers, never instrumented or measured as a research method.
The research loop feeding back on the researcher — but the object was mentorship and identity, not the research process.
Research on research at field scale, third-person and aggregate. The first-person version is not part of the programme.
A published study whose data are the researcher’s own process traces — decisions, revisions, dead ends — analysed against stated criteria, showing a measured improvement across iterations (fewer wasted searches, faster gap identification) that’s attributable to the self-study itself.
A capture-everything workflow, owned by the person doing the work, where everything they feed in makes their own future work faster — instead of enriching a platform.
Most digital pipelines run one way: you do the work, a platform keeps the data, the memory and the cut. Gig drivers watched their share of each fare fall from about 80% to as low as 55–65% in under a decade. Data labellers generate the value AI companies sell, and capture almost none of it.
The flipped design: a pipeline you own end to end — capture everything, sort it, enrich it, and get it back as usable context exactly when you need it — so the person doing the work is the person the system makes faster. Two famous one-person projects prove a human can run such a pipeline for decades. But nobody has ever defined it as a design, tested it properly, or even built a way to measure “benefit to the worker.”
The purest worker-beneficiary pipeline ever built — and a single-subject experiment, never generalised into a design principle.
The canonical self-benefiting pipeline — analogue, one person, and its benefit was never measured against any alternative.
Strong evidence for the pipeline’s individual stages — nothing about the whole system, or who benefits from it.
The ownership principle, proven for labour marketplaces — never applied to a personal knowledge pipeline.
A controlled comparison: a self-hosted capture → context → recall pipeline against a platform baseline, with the worker’s benefit — time-to-recall, reuse, value captured — as the headline outcome. Whoever runs that study defines the field.
Software guesses where fields sit on real paper. There is no standard way to score how wrong the guess is — and a legal question about AI-copied handwriting that nobody, anywhere, has answered.
When software reads a form, every benchmark grades the same thing: did it read the right words? Almost nothing grades position — how far the box it drew sits from where the field actually is on the paper. A guess can be 2 millimetres off (fine) or 2 centimetres off (the value lands in the wrong box entirely) and today’s scores can’t tell the difference. There is no agreed ruler for placement error. Building one — a metric plus a benchmark of guessed-vs-true field positions on real forms — would be a first.
AI has been able to copy a person’s handwriting style since 2013, well enough that samples “cannot always be told from real ones.” Now the unasked question: if you use it to fill in your own form, in your own handwriting, with your own permission — is that legally your signature? E-signature law (the ESIGN Act) judges by intent: a mark you adopt intending to sign can count. Forgery law only punishes deceptive use. Honest use of your own synthesised hand falls exactly between the two — and no case, paper or authority found addresses it. Even the companies selling AI signature generators disclaim that their output is “not automatically legally valid.”
The nearest thing to a placement metric — but it scores a parser’s layout detection, not the error of an inferred field position against the paper original.
Labels, not positions. One dataset paper even notes flat F1 can’t score structure — the gap’s own complaint, without a fix.
Verification is not validity: it can flag a fake, but it never asks when a synthesised signature legitimately counts.
The nearest precedent — a non-handwritten mark accepted — but it concerns fonts, not synthesised handwriting, and rests on a Q&A answer, not scholarship.
Two firsts, either one publishable: (a) a placement-error metric — say, average normalised displacement plus overlap-weighted field error — released with a benchmark of inferred-vs-true field positions on real forms; (b) the first rigorous legal analysis (or test case) of self-synthesised handwriting under ESIGN/UETA and their international equivalents.
A system guesses where something goes. A human drags it to the right place. The difference between the guess and the fix is a pattern — and every existing system throws it away.
Picture software that fills in a paper form — or places parts on a board. It makes its best guess at where each item belongs. You look, and you nudge: a bit left, a touch down, slightly rotated. That nudge is not random. If the system always guesses a few millimetres too low on this kind of page, the nudges will all point the same way — and a smart system could learn the pattern and stop making that mistake.
Learning from corrections is a huge, mature field. But in every system found, the correction is swallowed as a brand-new answer, or counted as “time saved.” The diff — the actual vector between guess and fix — is never kept, never modelled, never learned from. The most informative part of the interaction is the part everyone deletes.
Corrections as a training signal — but to field values, not positions. No diff of an adjustment is ever modelled.
The corrections here are genuinely spatial — the closest published analogue. But the diff is used to spread edits around, not to learn why placements were wrong.
Real document workflows with real placement corrections — measured purely as effort saved. The corrections teach the system nothing.
A system that records every (guess placement, human-adjusted placement) pair, computes the diff, fits a model of the systematic error — and then proves, on documents it has never seen, that learning from the diff beats retraining on the corrected answers alone.
Forecasters can bet on whether a known study will hold up. Nobody has tested whether a person can predict the specific findings of a paper they have never read.
There’s a well-studied party trick in science: show experts a published study and let them bet on whether it will replicate — whether doing the experiment again gives the same result. Prediction markets get that right about 73% of the time. Impressive — but notice the two cushions: the forecasters read the paper first, and the bet is only yes or no.
The untested version removes both cushions. You get a paper’s title and field — nothing else — and you must predict its specific findings: which hypothesis won, which direction the effect went, roughly how big it was. No study, anywhere, has run that test. And the warning signs say it would be humbling: in one study, cancer experts forecast a 75% chance that certain results would replicate — and zero out of five did.
The flagship result of the neighbouring field — with both cushions firmly in place.
The elicitation machinery an unread-findings test would need — built for known claims.
Forecasting specified, fully-stated questions. In the target task, the forecaster doesn’t even see the question the paper asked — only its title.
Suggests unread-findings prediction would be poor — but that’s an inference, not a measurement. Nobody has measured it.
A preregistered study: give participants only a paper’s title and field metadata, ask them to predict its specific findings — which of several hypotheses was supported, the effect’s direction and size band — then score the predictions against the actual paper, against a chance baseline. First run of that experiment defines the task.
Write the message so it survives on its own — background, definitions and edge cases packed inside — because whoever reads it may never see the conversation it came from.
When two people talk, they quietly build common ground — shared understanding of what words mean, what’s been decided, what “it” refers to. Psychologists call the building process grounding, and between humans it’s well understood. Between a human and an AI, it mostly fails: studies show today’s AI systems assume common ground instead of building it — and, remarkably, the training that makes them follow instructions (RLHF) made the problem worse, because it teaches them to act on commands rather than check understanding.
The fix nobody has tried in print: stop relying on the conversation. Deliberately write self-encapsulating messages — messages built like sealed capsules that carry their own prerequisites, definitions and edge cases, designed to be re-read cold, later, by a reader who wasn’t there. Researchers searched for this idea under every name they could think of. It does not exist in the published record. Neither does its cousin: deliberately pre-loading shared understanding before a human–AI task begins.
The key diagnosis of the problem this area addresses. It diagnoses; it doesn’t design the message-side remedy.
Measures the deficit precisely. Doesn’t test pre-loaded or self-encapsulating messages as the cure.
The nearest implemented remedy — but it’s reactive, turn by turn, inside a live conversation. The target works before and without one.
Communal common ground is the nearest existing concept to pre-loaded understanding — but it’s assumed from membership, never deliberately constructed per message. And self-encapsulation deliberately spends more effort up front to save effort later — a trade the least-effort principle never evaluates.
One clean experiment: give matched content to human–AI pairs two ways — as a plain message, and as a self-encapsulating message (prerequisites, edge cases, disambiguation packed in). Then remove the context and test comprehension and task success. Success = the encapsulated message still works cold; the plain one doesn’t.
The research behind this page flagged its own weak spots rather than smoothing them over. They are: